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1. New and Revived Issues in Projection Theory
This paper will present a new approach1 to the projection problem for presupposi-
tions with a number of distinctive predictions and theoretical properties. Although
the new approach is interesting as an exercise in providing a purely semantic ac-
count of presupposition projection that does not make use of dynamic machinery
(compare Peters 1977), its primary interest is in the methodological and empirical
characteristics that distinguish it from most other theories.
1.1. Overgeneration and Predictive Theories
Many theories of presupposition projection, including most in the popular dynamic
semantics tradition (exepliﬁed by Heim 1983), encode the projection behavior of a
quantiﬁer or connective in its lexical entry. While a dynamic meaning has no sepa-
rate component that describes a projection property, dynamic theories do overgen-
erate dynamic meanings in the sense that, from the basic set-theoretic components
regularly used to state dynamic meanings, we could build for any classical truth
function or quantiﬁer many different dynamic meanings that would agree with the
classical function for static, bivalent, but would produce vastly different patterns
of projection behavior. This overgeneration is a form of predictive and explana-
tory weakness, and it fails to account for the apparent non-arbitrariness of pairings
between normal truth-conditional content and projection behavior.2
The issue of overgeneration or lack of predictiveness has been known for
some time (see, e.g., Heim 1990, Soames 1989), and although it is most often
brought up in discussions of dynamic semantics, it is relevant to many other the-
ories of projection as well. These concerns are not new, but attention to the de-
velopment of predictive theories has increased in recent years, with a number of re-
The research leading to this paper has beneﬁted immeasurably from the communications with
Philippe Schlenker, Ed Keenan, all the participants in the Fall 2007 UCLA presupposition seminar,
Emmanuel Chemla, Roni Katzir, Giorgio Magri, Danny Fox, Ed Stabler, Daniel B¨ uring, Marcus
Kracht, and others. My work on presupposition projection has been supported in part by Grad-
uate Research Mentorship and a Graduate Summer Research Mentorship provided by the UCLA
Graduate Division and by NSF Grant BCS-0617316 (under the supervision of Philippe Schlenker).
1This approach is one of a family of approaches discussed in my M.A. thesis (George 2008b), to
which the reader may should refer for further discussion of the empirical issues involved and a more
rigorous formalization of the system.
2Space constraints prevent a more complete treatment of these issues, but many of the references
(see especially Schlenker 2008a, 2006, Heim 1990, Soames 1989, LaCasse 2008, George 2008b)
provide additional discussion.
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new attempts to unite the study of presuppositions and scalar implicatures (Chemla
2008)) and predictive variations on dynamic semantics (such as local context the-
ory (Schlenker 2008b) and dynamic semantics with a constrained lexicon (LaCasse
2008)).
The predictive theory presented in this paper differs from those mentioned
above in that it maintains a static semantics, but analyzes projection in semantic,
rather than pragmatic, terms.
1.2. Empirical Issues
Although a more constraining theory may be methodologically desirable, empirical
adequacy is, obviously, also quite important, so I want to consider some natural
language examples where my judgments are not in keeping with the predictions of
many popular theories. Such disparity is of interest to the study of projection in
general, but bad predictions are especially problematic for a predictive theory. A
non-predictive projection theory can often address the problematic predictions of
the projection behavior of a connective or quantiﬁer by changing its lexical entry,
but in a predictive theory such a response will be difﬁcult or impossible: incorrect
predictions will usually require us to revise the architecture of the whole theory, not
just to make minor lexical adjustments.
1.3. Differences Between Quantiﬁers
Many theories of projection, whatever their theoretical orientation, attribute uni-
versal or near-universal presuppositions to all cases of quantiﬁcation over a pre-
suppositional predicate. This seems appropriate for certain quantiﬁers, since, for
example, it is plausible that (3) should be a presupposition of (1) and (2):
(1) Each of these ten students has stopped smoking.
(2) None of these ten students has stopped smoking.
(3) Each of these ten students has smoked in the past.
However, although theories of projection often treat all quantiﬁers as the
same or nearly the same in their projection behavior, many quantiﬁers with a less
universal ﬂavor than those in (1) and (2) don’t seem to be associated with strong
universal inferences. In particular, it is not at all clear that we should attribute a
universal presupposition to (4), and (5) seems quite true and appropriate in a world
where exactly three students are former smokers, and the rest have never smoked:
(4) At least one of these ten students has stopped smoking.
(5) Exactly three of these ten students have stopped smoking.
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(3), we will need a theory that attributes different projection behavior to different
quantiﬁers. For a predictive theory, we will need some account of how projection
and truth-conditional content are associated, but the need to at least superﬁcially
account of the disparity between quantiﬁers is independent of the issue of predic-
tiveness, and this need is unmet by many popular theories of projection.
1.4. Restrictors
The projection of presuppositions from restrictors is poorly understood, but many
theories make the resulting presuppositions implausibly strong. Consider the fol-
lowing example:
(6) Every logician who dislikes her employer drinks tea.
Although some theories would predict that (6) should presuppose that every
logician is employed, my intuition is that (6) can be quite true in a world where
there are unemployed logicians. Indeed, if the only employed entity in the world is
a logician, and there are thousands of unemployed logicians, but the one employed
logician hates her employer and drinks tea, (6) seems quite true.
2. Description of the Theory
Although the analysis presented here is not dynamic, it is trivalent, with a third
truth value - written # - encoding presupposition failure. The presuppositions of
a sentence are just the proposition picking out the cases where its truth value is
not #. The theory describes a procedure for combining trivalent functions, and
projection predictions are identiﬁed by seeing how this procedure allows or doesn’t
allow presupposition failure in one constituent to cause presupposition failure for
the whole sentence. That presuppositions place requirements on common ground
is presumed to be the result of a conversational rule that renders it uncooperative to
utter a sentence to which any participant might assign the truth value #.4
2.1. Function Deployment
The basic extensions of linguistic expressions will, as usual, be functions, although
here we’ll want to work with functions of multiple arguments in their un-Curried
3Although I am reasonably conﬁdent of my judgments, especially for the exactly cases, it cannot
be overemphasized that there is a considerable disagreement among both linguists and na¨ ıve speak-
ers about which inferences are warranted with such examples; recent experimental work (Chemla
2007) calls attention to the high degree of uncertainty on this point.
4This is, of course, not a complete account of the discourse act of presupposing. Given the some
presupposition triggers, and a system of function combination that explains how triggers attach
semantic presuppositions to sentences, we can choose any of a number of discourse theories to
relate semantic presuppositions of sentences to various conversational acts.
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presuppositional arguments, so ordinary function application wil not be able to
combine a function with a presuppositional argument. Instead, the formalism pre-
sented here is based on an alternative notion of function-argument combination -
function deployment - to handle presuppositional arguments.
Function deployment will be built from function application using the no-
tion of a repair: every argument x is associated with a family of repairs that depends
on x, the extension of the function of which x is an argument, and the arguments
that precede x in linear order. The repairs for any x preserve the bivalent part of x,
differing from x only in that they substitute some bivalent content for its presuppo-
sitional part. For this reason, if x is entirely bivalent, the only repair of x will be
x itself, but if x is presuppositional in any way then x will not be a repair of itself.
Putting aside for the moment how we compute repairs, deployment is deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (Function Deployment) For an n-ary function f and a list x ,...,xn
of arguments for f, if there is b such that for any y ,...,yn and z ,...,zn that are ac-
ceptable lists of repairs for x ,...xn,f (y ,...,yn)=f(z ,...,zn)=b, then f deployed
on x ,...,xn, written f[x ,...,xn], is equal to b. Otherwise, f[x ,...,xn]=#.
The intuition underlying this is that the deployment of f on a list of argu-
ments is the value that would result from applying f to any repairs of its arguments,
and if there is not a unique consensus value (because different repairs produce dif-
ferent outcomes), then we have presupposition failure.
The results of function deployment will depend on what the repairs of the
arguments are in the context at hand. The general deﬁnition of repair sets appears
in Section 2.2, but things are simple in the truth-functional case: the only repair of
0 is 0, the only repair of 1 is 1, and both 0 and 1 are repairs of #. In the case of truth
values, we can undestand # as representing uncertainty between 0 and 1.
Knowing these repairs, we can compute the deployment effects and projec-
tion facts for the various truth functions. The resulting trivalent system is just that
of the strong Kleene trivalent logic (Kleene 1952), with symmetrical projection be-
haviors that agree with standard dynamic accounts for presuppositions in the latter
argument of a truth function, as can be seen in the linguistic examples below.
2.1.1. Deployment of Negation
To see how this works for negation, consider the following pair of sentences:
(7) Smith knows that he is incompetent.
(8) Smith doesn’t know that he is incompetent.
The truth value of (7) is 1 if Smith is incompetent and knows it, 0 if Smith
is incompetent but doesn’t know it, and # if smith is competent. To compute the
presuppositions of (8), one deploys the usual (bivalent) negation function on the
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value, so the truth value of (8) is just ¬0, which is to say 1. Likewise, if (7) is true,
the only repair we must consider is 1, so its negation (8) is false. Finally, if (7)
suffers presupposition failure and takes the truth value #, then we have two repairs -
0 and 1, so we need to evaluate both. We ﬁnd that (¬0) =(¬1), so the function does
not produce the same value for all possible repairs of the argument, so the value of
this ¬ deployed at # is #. That is, (8) suffers pressupposition failure iff (7) does, so
it is predicted that both presuppose that Smith is incompetent.
2.1.2. Deployment of Disjunction
For disjunction, consider the following four sentences:
(9) Jones has stopped smoking.
(10) Jones has never smoked.
(11) Jones has never smoked, or Jones has stopped smoking.
(12) Jones has stopped smoking, or Jones has never smoked.
To understand the truth, falsehood, and failure conditions of (11), we com-
pute the deployment of the truth function  or  over the truth values of (9) and (10).
First, then, what does it take to make (11) true? If Jones has never smoked, then
(10) takes truth value 1, and (9) takes truth value #. The two repairs of # are 0 an
1, but  or (1,0)=1 and  or (1,1)=1, so both repairs lead to the same value, so
 or [1,#]=1. So if Jones has never smoked, (11) is true, as it is if Jones is a former
smoker (in which case we have  or [0,1]=1, since if Jones is a former smoker (9)
is true and (10) is false). If neither of these is the case, then (10) must be false,
so Jones smoked at one point, so the presuppositions of (9) are met, but Jones is
not an ex-smoker and has smoked, and so must still smoke, so (9) is false as well.
Since both disjuncts are false, (11) is in this case false. This exhausts all the cases:
(11) is true if Jones has never smoked or Jones is an ex-smoker, and false otherwise
(i.e., when Jones persists in smoking), and so has no presuppositions, even though
(9) is presuppositional. Further, since the system as presented so far is symmet-
ric, (12) has the same truth conditions and presuppositions as (11), and so is again
presuppositionless. This is plausible, but somewhat contentious.
The fact that the disjunction examples above do not have any predicted pre-
suppositions is a result of the choice of disjuncts. The system does allow a sentence
formed by disjunction to suffer presupposition failure, as in the following example:
(13) Jones called Smith, or Smith knows Jones is incompetent.
This sentence is assigned the truth value # if Jones didn’t call Smith (so that
the ﬁrst disjunct is false) but Jones is not incompetent (so the second disjunct suf-
fers failure). In this case, the deployment that determines the truth value of (13) is
 or [0,#]. To evaluate this, one must consider the two repairs of #: 0 and 1, so the
possibilities are  or (0,0)=0 and  or (0,1)=1. Since 0  = 1, the two repairs yield
362 Benjamin R. Georgedifferent outcomes, so  or [0,#]=#. This is the only case in which failure results,
for this sentence: if Jones did call Smith and Jones is not incompetent, the truth
value is  or [1,#], which is 1, as noted above, and in all other cases both disjuncts
have their presuppositions met, so there’s no need to worry about multiple repairs.
(13) suffers failure iff Jones didn’t call and Jones is not incompetent, or, equiva-
lently, it presupposes that if Jones didn’t call then Jones is incompetent. This is the
standard prediction, and we again predict that reversing the order of the disjuncts
will not change the truth-conditions or presuppositions.
2.1.3. Deployment of Conjunction
For conjunction, consider the following:
(14) France is a monarchy and the king of France is bald.
(14) is true if both conjuncts are true: in this case, since 1 is the only re-
pair for 1 we have  and [1,1]= and (1,1)=1. Next, the sentence is false if
either conjunct is false: if France is not a monarchy then since  and (0,1)=0 and
 and (0,1)=0,  and [0,#]=0 as well, and if France has a non-bald king then
likewise this is enough to guarantee falsehood. The only remaining case is the case
where one conjunct is true and the other has truth value # - that is, when France
is a monarchy without a king, (because, for example, it has an empress instead),
in which case we have  and [1,#]. The two repairs to consider are  and (1,1)=1
and  and (1,0)=0. Since the repairs disagree,  and [1,#]=#. Thus, (14) suf-
fers failure iff France is a monarchy but there is no king of France; equivalently,
it presupposes that the king if France is a monarchy then it has a king. This is
the standard claim for this sentence. Here, again, a simple deployment approach
predicts symmetry, which is a bit hard to swallow.
2.2. Computing Repair Sets
For the case of truth values, the repairs for # were 0 and 1. To use deployment with
quantiﬁers, we need to deﬁne repairs for higher-type arguments like predicates.
2.2.1. Two Possible Repairs
For every function g that maps sequences of arguments to truth values, two repairs
will be of potential interest - the ﬁrst, written g /#, treats all cases of presupposition
failure as if they were cases of falsehood, and the second g /#, treats all cases of
presupposition failure as if they were cases of truth. So, for example, (16) is true of
those entities of which (15) is true, and false of all others, while (17) is false of all
entities of which (15) is false, and true of all others - the two collapse the presuppo-
sitional part of (15) in opposite directions, while leaving the bivalent content from
(15) unchanged.
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(16) g /#    once smoked, but has stopped 
(17) g /#    has never smoked or has stopped smoking 
If we treat truth values as zero-ary functions, they’re a special case of this:
0 /# = 0 /# = 0, and 1 /# = 1 /# = 1, but # /# = 0 while # /# = 1: the two repairs
are only different for #.
One simple approach would be to generalize things straightforwardly by
saying that we always consider both repairs. For many quantiﬁers commonly stud-
ied, the results of this would be tolerable, if a bit odd.5 Unfortunately, the presuppo-
sitions predicted by this approach are too strong in cases where quantiﬁers appear to
treat presupposition failure as indistinguishable from falsehood, as with restrictors
and exactly quantiﬁcation:
(18) Every student who knows that he is incompetent becomes depressed.
(19) Exactly three of these students have stopped smoking.
If we must consider both repairs of the restrictor in (18), then the sentence
is only true if both of the repair substitutions below are true:
(20) p =  student who knows that he is incompetent 
(21) Every student who is incompetent and knows it becomes depressed.
(Substitution of p /#.)
(22) Every student who is not incompetent or knows that he is incompetent be-
comes depressed.
(Substitution of p /#.)
However, the prediction that (22) must be true in order for (18) to be true
is counterintuitive. Instead, (18) appears to have almost exactly the same truth
conditions as (21): considering only one repair improves our predictions here.
We encounter the same issue with the exactly quantiﬁcation in (19), where
the sentence seems to have the same truth conditions as (24), but can apparently be
quite true while (25) is false:
(23) p =  has stopped smoking 
(24) Exactly three of these students once smoked, but have stopped.
(Substitution of p /#.)
(25) Exactly three of these students never smoked or have stopped smoking.
(Substitution of p /#.)
From these kinds of examples, it seems tempting to only consider the p /#
repair, but of course if applied generally this would make presupposition failure
indistinguishable from ﬂasehood. To identify the cases in which both repairs must
be considered, it will be necessary to develop the notion of a relevant set.
5I have discussed the implications of this approach elsehere (George 2008a,b); this simple ap-
proach is especially reminiscent of supervaluation (van Fraassen 1969) and strong Kleene (Kleene
1952) systems.
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If we accept the empirical claims outlined in sections 1.2 and 2.2.1, and we want
to pursue a theory involving p /# and p /# as repairs, we’ll need to devise a system
where sometimes both of these repairs are in admissible, and sometimes only p /#
is. These cases will be distinguished using incremental relevant sets.
A relevant set is deﬁned with respect to a function f that takes other func-
tions as arguments.6 A relevant set is a set X such that, in evaluating f with respect
to its next argument, one only needs to be concerned with the behavior of that ar-
gument with respect to the elements of X. In the case where f takes predicates as
arguments, X can be thought of as a set containing all entities relevant to the deter-
mination of how a particular predicate will interact with f. The relevant set at hand
will change, incrementally, as we progress through the arguments of the function,
or, equivalently, the relevant set for a particular argument will depend on the prior
but not the subsequent arguments.7 The the major use of the notion of a relevant
set is (very roughly) that it picks out for a quantiﬁer’s ﬁrst argument position (the
restrictor) the set consisting of the whole universe, while for the second argument
position (the nuclear scope) it picks out the set described by the restrictor. Although
the formalization here somewhat obscures this, it turns out (cf. George 2008b) that
the relevant set can be recovered from the behavior of the function in light of the
prior arguments without explicit knowledge of the content of the prior arguments
- computing relevant sets allows us, in many cases, to recover the extension of the
restrictor from a generalized quantiﬁer.
Relevant sets are deﬁned in terms of the idea of functions agreeing on a set:
Deﬁnition 2 (Agreement of Functions on a Set) Functions b and b  agree on a
set of arguments8 X iff, for all x   X, b(x)=b (x).
For example, the b and b  below agree on the set X of all students:
(26) b =  has stopped smoking 
(27) b  =  has stopped smoking and is a student 
A relevant set is a set X such that agreement on that X guarantees equivalent
behavior in the argument position in question, thus:
Deﬁnition 3 (Relevant Sets) A set X is a relevant set for a function f and and a
(partial, perhaps empty) list of arguments a ,...,am   iff, for every a pair of ar-
guments bm and b 
m such that bm and b 
m agree on X, and every (possibly empty)
6of course, with a suitable notion of zero-ary functions, this is not really a substantial limitation.
7In the deﬁnitions of relevant sets and the subsequent formal devices, I will be glossing over
some issues that would make the proper formulation of these deﬁnitions a bit more cumberson. I
have developed a somewhat more rigorous and complete treatment elsewhere (George 2008b).
8We should perhaps say sequences of arguments, to account for the possibility that b and b  might
not be unary.
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f(a ,...,am  ,b 
m,cm+ ,...cn).9
To pick a linguistically motivated example, consider the two-argument func-
tion  each , with  student  for its ﬁrst argument. Any set X such that all stu-
dents are in X is a relevant set for  each  and  student , since for any such X
and any predicates p and p  that agree on X, p and p  have the same value for
any student, so each student has property p iff each student has property p , so
 each ( student ,p)= each ( student ,p ) (since the function takes only two ar-
guments, the list of later arguments is empty). That any set containing all students
would do the job is a consequence of the conservativity of natural language deter-
miners (Keenan and Stavi 1986), and that no set not containing all students will do
the job follows from the observation that if we had a set X that left out even one
student, a function p mapping all students to 1 and a a function p  mapping just that
one excluded student to 0 would agree on X, but would produce different outcomes
for this quantiﬁcation.
For purposes of this paper, I will speak of the relevant set of a function and
a list of arguments when I mean the smallest relevant set. In general, of course,
not every function has a least relevant set, but the exceptions will not be an issue
when we restrict attention to ﬁnite domains and linguistically typical quantiﬁers.10
Observe in particular that, for most quantiﬁers, the relevant set of the quantiﬁer
with the empty argument list is the universe of all entities, and the relevant set
of the quantiﬁer with an argument list containing a well-behaved restrictor is the
restrictor. The relevant set picks out ‘all the stuff we’re concerned with’.11
2.2.3. Identifying the Repairs
Given the relevant set, we can identify the available repairs. For a function g, the
function g /# is always considered as an available repair, but the function g /# is
only considered a repair g /# is ‘too boring’ in that it maps nothing in the relevant
set to 1:
Deﬁnition 4 (Available Repairs) For any function g being evaluated as an argu-
ment of a function f and preceded by arguments a ,...,an, where X is the relevant
set of f and a ,...,an, if g(x)=1 for some x   X then g /# is the only available
repair for g, but if there is no x   X such that g(x)=1, then the available repairs
for g are both g /# and g /#.
9This deﬁnition is technically problematic when a preceding argument had presuppositional con-
tent, but the generalization to this case (used in George 2008b) doesn’t involve any interesting con-
ceptual changes.
10The way to avoid such issues is to replace all references to ‘the relevant set’ in what follows
with references to ‘every relevant set’.
11When truth values are understood as zero-ary functions and relevant sets are sets of argument
sequences, the relevant set of a truth function with a partial argument list is either the empty set or
the set containing only the empty sequence.
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only consider p /#, in which case presupposition failure and falsehood will be
equivalent. However, in certain cases p /# will come into play, and, perhaps, in-
troduce enough uncertainty to cause presupposition failure. Note that, if p is non-
presuppositional, then p /# = p /# = p, so we really only need to worry about what
repair set we’re choosing when presuppositional predicates are involved. If p maps
everything in the relevant set to 0 (and so doesn’t map anything to #), then both p /#
and p /# are considered, but they’re also both the same. Now that we know how to
ﬁnd the repairs for a broader array of functions, our deﬁnition of deployment stays
the same: if all available repairs produce the same result, we go with that result, but
if the available repairs yield different results we have failure.
This approach produces mostly appropriate truth conditions, but gives us
rather weak presuppositions. To see this, consider the following example:
(28) Each student has stopped smoking.
To evaluate (28), we deploy  each  on the arguments  student  and  has
stopped smoking . Now, since  student  has no presuppositions, its only possible
repair is itself, so we just need to identify the repairs of p= has stopped smoking .
The relevant set of  each  and  student  is just the set of students, so if at least one
student is a former smoker, then p maps at least one member of the relevant set
to 1, and the only available repair is p /#    used to smoke but doesn’t smoke at
present . If none of the students is a former smoker, then p maps everything in the
relevant set to 0 or #, so the available repairs will be both p /#    doesn’t smoke 
and p /#. We can now identify the predicted truth, falsehood, and failure conditions
of the sentence.
First, when is (28) predicted to take the truth value 1? For this to be the
case, it must be that  each ( student ,p )=1, for every p  that’s an available repair
of p. This is the case iff  each ( student ,p /#)=1, since then (by monotonicity
of  each )  each ( student ,p /#)=1, so for establishing truth we only need to
consider p /#, which is always an available repair. Now,  each ( student ,p /#)=1
iff every student is a former smoker, so that’s when (28) is true. Thus if (28) is
true then every student has smoked, so the inference that’s normally described as a
universal presupposition comes through as an entailment.
Next, when is (28) predicted to take the truth value 0? This can come
about in two ways. First, if even one student is a former smoker, then, as noted
above, the only available repair is p /#, so if there is one student former smoker and
 each ( student ,p /#)=0, then we predict (28) is false. That is, the sentence is
false when there is one student who is a former smoker, but it is not the case that
every student is a former smoker. This means we predict that the sentence can take
the truth value 0 even if some students have never smoked, provided that there is
one student who used to smoke and has given it up. On the other hand, if no student
is a former smoker, then both p /# and p /# are available repairs, so for the (28) to
be false it needs to be false when we substitute either of these as an argument, so it
needs to be false that every student is a former smoker and it also needs to be false
that every student is a nonsmoker - that is, there needs to be one student who still
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Finally, when do we predict (28) takes the truth value #? The sentence
suffers presupposition failure if it is neither true nor false. More explicitly, we
have presupposition failure when both repairs are available (which is the case iff no
student is a former smoker) and they produce different results, so the propositions
that every student is a former smoker and that every student is a nonsmoker must
have different truth values. Since in this case no student is a former smoker, it
follows, so long as there are any students at all, that it must be false that every
student is a former smoker, but then to get the disagreement that leads to failure, it
must be true that every student is a nonsmoker. Thus, to have presupposition failure,
it must be the case that no student presently smokes, but also that no student is a
former smoker, which is to say it must be the case that no student has ever smoked.
Thus, the present approach predicts that (28) presupposes the opposite of this: it
presupposes that at least one student has smoked at some point.
Thus, the system as described so far predicts only an existential presuppo-
sition from the nuclear scope of a universal quantiﬁcation. As already noted, it also
predicts a symmetrical projection behavior for and. A revision of the deployment
operation will strengthen presuppositions to address these issues.
2.3. Revising Function Deployment
The function deployment I want to advocate here modiﬁes the version presented
above to regain universal presuppositions for some quantiﬁers, including the uni-
versal quantiﬁer, and to make the projection behavior of and asymmetrical. The
underlying intuition is that, in reasoning about presuppositions, we consider sepa-
rately the preconditions for truth and the preconditions for falsehood, and that we
want, on top of the deployment discussed so far, to demand that the preconditions
for truth are (incrementally) satisﬁed before we permit any non-failure truth value,
even 0. Put another way, if we move through the arguments of a function one at a
time, we demand that we should never be forced to conclude that the output of the
function is not 1 based on the presuppositions of an argument - truth may be ruled
out, of course, but it must be ruled out by the assertive, rather than the presuppo-
sitional, component of an argument, and if the presuppositions ever rules out truth
then the entire expression suffers presupposition failure.
The above will be codiﬁed in terms of the notion of disappointing argu-
ments, where disappointment is deﬁned in terms of the function deployment de-
veloped above. To deﬁne disappointment, we need to be able to talk about which
aspects of an argument’s behavior are caused by its presuppositional rather than its
assertive component. The key to this is the notion of presupposition-equivalence.
Deﬁnition 5 (Presupposition-equivalence) Functions f and g of the same type
are presupposition-equivalent iff they map exactly the same arguments to #. (In
the case of zero-ary truth functions (i.e. truth values) this means that 0 and 1 are
presupposition-equivalent to each other and to themselves, but # is presupposition-
equivalent only to itself.)
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to each other, since, although they may be true or false of different entities, they all
map the same entities (those without advisors) to #:
(29) admires his advisor.
(30) admires his advisor and is allergic to grapefruit.
(31) admires his advisor and drinks heavily.
With this notion of equivalence, we can deﬁne disappointment:
Deﬁnition 6 (Disappointment) For any function f and any initial sequence of ar-
guments a ,...,am  , the argument bm has disappointing presuppositions with re-
spect to f and a ,...,am   iff the following two criteria both hold:
• For every b 
m that is presupposition-equivalent to bm, and for all cm+ ,...,cn,
f[a ,...,am  ,b 
m,cm+ ,...,cn]  =  .
• There are dm,...,dn such that f[a ,...,am  ,dm,...,dn]= .
The ﬁrst criterion says that, based only on bm’s presuppositions and what
has come before, we can rule out any hope for truth, and the second says that the
arguments before bm hold out hope for truth, so that we can be sure bm is the source
of the disappointment.
To see how disappointment works, suppose that there are three students, that
one of them smokes and has smoked for some time, and that the other two don’t
smoke and never have. Now consider the function  each  and the initial argument
 student . In this context, the nuclear scope argument  has stopped smoking  is dis-
appointing. The ﬁrst condition for disappointment is met because  each [p,q]=1
iff everything that has property p has property q, so in particular nothing with prop-
erty p can cause anything with property q to suffer presupposition failure, but the
two never-smoking students do cause  has stopped smoking  to suffer presuppo-
sition failure, and will likewise for any predicate that is presupposition-equivalent
to  has stopped smoking . The second condition of disappointment just demands
that there be a way to ﬁll in the nuclear scope that makes a sentence starting each
student... come out true - here  x.(1) will work. Having seen the quantiﬁer and
the restrictor, there is hope of truth, but the presuppositional aspects of the nuclear
scope dash these hopes.
Now all that is left is to build a disappointment check into a revised notion
of deployment:
Deﬁnition 7 (Deployment with Concern for Disappointment) For any function
f and any full sequence a ,...,an of arguments for f, f:(a ,...,an):, the deploy-
ment of f on a ,...,an with concern for disappointment, is deﬁned as follows:
• Ifthereism nsuchthatam isdisappointingwithrespectto f anda ,...,am  ,
then f:(a ,...,an): = #.
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That is, deployment with concern for disappointment always yields failure
when any of the arguments is disappointing in light of the preceding arguments,
and otherwise it behaves like normal deployment by ﬁnding all the repairs for each
argument (based on the relevant set calculation discussed above) and seeing if every
choice of repairs produces the same results.
2.3.1. Deployment with Disappointment and the Connectives
To see how deployment with disappointment works, consider the case of and, and
in particular the following two sentences:
(32) Smith is a fool and he knows that he is a fool.
(33) Smith knows that he is a fool and he is a fool.
In assessing these sentences, there are three cases to consider. First, there
is the case where Smith is a fool and is aware of his own foolishness. In this case,
both conjuncts are true, so both sentences take the truth value  and :(1,1):. Now,
1 is not disappointing in either of these argument positions since in both cases its
presuppositional content is compatible with truth: 1 is presupposition-equivalent to
1, and  and [1,1]= and (1,1)= 1. Since the argument are not disappointing, we
use regular function deployment. The only repair for 1 in either context is 1, so the
sentence is true.
Next, consider the case where Smith is a fool, but doesn’t know it. In this
case, (32) takes the truth value  and :(1,0):. Here, the initial 1 is not disappointing
because it is compatible with truth (in the case where hypothetical the second argu-
ment is 1), and 0 is not disappointing because it is presupposition-equivalent to 1,
which will yield truth here. With (33), the truth value is given by  and :(0,1):. The
initial 0 is not disappointing because it is presupposition-equivalent to 1, and 1 in
the ﬁrst argument position of  and  is compatible with an outcome of truth. For the
second argument position there is no hope of truth: the presence of 0 in the ﬁrst po-
sition makes falsehood a certainty, and there is no second argument that could save
us, so the second argument is not the source of disappointment. In both cases, we
have ruled out disappointment, and so we compute the deployment of  and  onto 0
and 1, in either order, and compute a truth value of 0.
Finally, there is the case where Smith is not a fool at all. Here the truth
value of (32) is  and :(0,#):. Now, the initial 0 is not disappointing (since it is
presupposition-equivalent to 1), and the subsequent # is not disappointing (because
the preceding 0 means we had no hope left to lose). Thus  and :(0,#):= and [0,#],
which is 0, since  and (0,0)= and (0,1)=0. This time, though, we do ﬁnd some
asymmetry with (33): here the truth value is given by  and :(#,0):, and now the ﬁrst
argument is disappointing. To see this, note that  and [#,0]=0 (since substituting
either 0 or 1 for # will produce the same false result) and  and [#,1]=# (since sub-
stituting 0 and substituting 1 would produce different outcomes, meaning there is a
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equivalent to itself, so just knowing its presupposition-equivalence class we can
rule out an outcome of 1. Before, we saw #, we still had hopes to disappoint, since
knowing only the arguments before # (that is, the empty argument list), there was
no way to rule out an outcome of 1. This means that (33) suffers presupposition
failure when Smith is not a fool. This is exactly the asymmetry associated with
traditional accounts of the projection of and, on which (33) presupposes that Smith
is a fool while (32) does not.
Since it is easier to get truth out of disjunction, or remains symmetrical after
thedisappointmentmodiﬁcation: since or [#,1]=1(because or (0,1)= or (1,1)=
1), a # in the ﬁrst argument position of a disjunction is not disappointing like it is
for a conjunction.
3. Some Predictions for Quantiﬁers
At last, we can explore the projection predictions for a few different quantiﬁca-
tional cases. We ﬁnd that the system predicts universal presuppositions for each and
none quantiﬁcation, but otherwise shares with the more basic deployment system
that was ﬁrst developed the appealingly weak presupposition effects for most other
quantiﬁers, and for presuppositional restrictors. The predictions that we obtain here
are distinctive in that they involve sharp contrasts between different quantiﬁers, and
they are also compatible with my own judgments.
3.1. Restrictors
Consider the following example of a presuppositional restrictor:
(34) Every student in the course who stopped smoking complained about the
exam.
Suppose that even one student was a former smoker. Since the relevant set
of  every  is the whole universe of entities,  student in the course who stopped
smoking  maps at least one entity in that relevant set (in particular, the student who
stopped smoking) to 1, so we only need to consider the repair that substitutes 0
for # (i.e. the predicate  student in the course who had smoked in the past, and
stopped ). Thus, if there was one student former smoker, the sentence is true if
every student former smoker complained about the exam, and false otherwise. We
don’t have to worry about disappointment here, since no restrictor could rule out
the possibility of an outcome of 1 (we could always put the predicate  x.(1) in
the nuclear scope), and the nuclear scope value is non-presuppositional, so it is
presupposition-equivalent to  x.(1) (since neither maps anything to #), so it does
not rule out hope for an outcome of truth by virtue of its presuppositions. We thus
avoid undesirably strong projection of restrictor presuppositions.
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Now let’s look at the projection properties of the nuclear scope of some quantiﬁers.
First, consider simple existential quantiﬁcaiton:
(35) At least one of these ten students has stopped smoking.
Let’s begin by ﬁguring out regular deployment and then see where disap-
pointment comes in. Under normal deployment if at least one of the students is a
former smoker, then the sentence gets truth value 1, since then it is true for either
repair of the nuclear scope p =  has stopped smoking  that at least one of the ten
students has the property identiﬁed by that repair (although in fact only one repair
will be considered in this case). If none of the ten students is a former smoker, then
(since the relevant set is the set of students), p maps nothing in the relevant set to
1, so both p /#    is a former smoker  and p /#    doesn’t smoke  are acceptable
repairs. We know that the quantiﬁcation is false when we substitute p /#, since
none of the students are former smokers, so, if it is also false when we substitute
p /#, the deployment is false, but otherwise we get the truth value # - that is, under
simple deployment, we get 0 if none of the students are former smokers and all of
the students still smoke, and # if none of the students are former smokers but some
don’t smoke (because they’ve never smoked).
Disappointment doesn’t change this. On the assumption that there is a group
of ten students to talk about, the restrictor is not disappointing (because it’s just the
set of ten students, which could always hold out hope for truth if combined with a
predicate like  x.(1)). Meanwhile, if at least one student has smoked in the past,
then the nuclear scope is presupposition-equivalent to a predicate that maps that
student to 1, which is enough to make the deployment true. Finally, if none of the
students have smoked in the past, then we do get disappointment, but then we would
have had failure under deployment anyway.
Thus, the sentence is true if one of the students is a former smoker, but for it
to be false the nuclear scope must be false of all the students, so its presupposition
must be true of all the students. Thus, we predict a presupposition that either at
least one student is a former smoker or all of the students persist in smoking.
3.3. each
Now consider the (36), with truth value determined by (37):
(36) Each of these ten students has stopped smoking.
(37)  each :( x.(x is one of these ten students), has stopped smoking ):
First, let’s consider when the arguments are disappointing. The ﬁrst argu-
ment (the restrictor) is never disappointing, since there is always some next argu-
ment that will yield an outcome of 1, since  each [p, x.(1)] = 1 for any choice of
p, including any p presupposition-equivalent to  x.(x is one of these ten students).
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dents has never smoked,  has stopped smoking  is disappointing with respect to
 each  and  x.(x is one of these ten students), because if there is a student y who
has never smoked,  has stopped smoking (y)=#, so q /#(y)=0 for any q that
is presupposition-equivalent to  has stopped smoking . Thus, since q /# is always
among the repairs of q, it’s always one of the repairs we’d consider in deployment,
so the quantiﬁed sentence might evaluate to 0 or # (depending on whether there’s
another repair and what it is), but never to 1. Since the nuclear scope is disappoint-
ing whenever any of the students doesn’t smoke and never has, we get presupposi-
tion failure (truth value #) whenever any of the students has never smoked. This is
the universal presupposition that every student has smoked before. If, on the other
hand, this presupposition is met (i.e. if every student used to smoke), then there is
no fear of disappointment, since  has stopped smoking  doesn’t fail for any of the
students, so it is presupposition-equivalent to the function that maps all the students
to 1 but behaves identically to  has stopped smoking  for all other arguments, and
this predicate will make the sentence true.
In the case where the nuclear scope of (36) is not disappointing, we ﬁnd
that all of the students have smoked in the past, so for the nuclear scope p =  has
stopped smoking , both p /# and p /# behave identically so far as the students are
concerned, so (36) gets truth value 1 if all the students are former smokers, and
0 if all of the students have smoked and at least one of them still does, and # (by
disappointment) in all the cases where at least one student has never smoked.
3.4. none
Next, consider (38), the truth value of which is evaluated by computing the deploy-
ment (39):
(38) None of these ten students has stopped smoking.
(39)  none :( x.(x is one of these ten students), has stopped smoking ):
As with the discussion of each, the ﬁrst argument here is never disappoint-
ing, so long as the reference to the ten students is unproblematic. However, the
second argument is again disappointing iff there is a student who has never smoked.
To see this, suppose some student y has never smoked, and let q be any predicate
presupposition-equivalent to  has stopped smoking . We know that q(y)=#, but
we have two cases to consider. If there is any student z such that q(z)=1 then in
evaluating the deployment  none [ x.(x is one of these ten students),q], we would
only need to consider q /#, but q /#(z)=1, so it’s not the case that q /# is true of
none of the students, so the deployment would evaluate to 0. If, on the other hand,
q maps none of the students to 1, then (since the students are the relevant set here),
both q /# and q /# are available as repairs, but q /#(y)=1, so q /# is true of some of
the students, so the deployment of  none  can’t give us truth here either. Since we
encounter disappointment if there is any student who has never smoked, we have
a universal presupposition that each of the students has smoked in the past. (Note
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other requirement for disappointment.)
If we avoid disappointment, no other presuppositional issues arise, since in
that case the nuclear scope suffers presupposition failure for none of the students,
so we have a bivalent case, and the sentence is true iff all of the students persist in
smoking, an false iff all of the students have smoked and at least one has stopped.
3.5. exactly three
Finally, consider the quantiﬁer exactly three:
(40) Exactly three of these ten students have stopped smoking.
Here, it will be best to work out the regular deployment and then check for
disappointment. Forregulardeployment. Therestrictor, beingnon-presuppositional,
has only one repair. If any of the students are former smokers, then the nuclear
scope is true of something in the relevant set (the restrictor), so it has only one re-
pair (roughly  is a former smoker ) as well - in this case, the deployment comes out
1 if the number of student former smokers is three, and 0 otherwise. On the other
hand, if none of the students are former smokers, then we must consider two repairs,
given roughly by  is a former smoker  and  doesn’t smoke ; since in this case none
of the students are former smokers, the substitution of  is a former smoker  pro-
duces truth value 0, so here we get 0 for the deployment if the number of students
who have never smoked is anything other than three, and # if the number of students
who have never smoked is exactly three.
Now we turn to disappointment. The restrictor is again unproblematic, hav-
ing no presuppositional content that concerns us. Further, if at least three students
have smoked before, then the nuclear scope is not disappointing, since then it is
presupposition-equivalent to some function that maps three students to 1 and the
rest to 0 or #, which under the deployment above will make the truth value come
out 1. However, if fewer than three of the students have ever smoked, we do get
disappointment, since in this case any predicate q presupposition-equivalent to the
nuclear scope maps at most two of the students to truth values other than #, so it
maps at most two of the students to 1, so q /# maps no more than two of the students
to 1, ruining any hope of q being true of exactly three of the students.
Under deployment with concern for disappointment, (40) suffers presuppo-
sition failure by disappointment if fewer than three of the students have smoked,
and it suffers presupposition failure from the deployment system if exactly three
of the students have never smoked and the rest presently smoke, and it is true if
exactly three of the students are former smokers (regardless of the smoking history,
or lack thereof, of the remaining seven students), and false in all other cases. This
is a desirably weaker-than-universal presupposition.
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